X.5: Data Informed Operations
Guest post by Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Horrigan
Before our deployment in 2017, we realized two things: 1 - we needed to better enable our Afghan partners to conduct independent operations and 2 - we needed more data to demonstrate their effectiveness.
Introduction
In 2017, I was the Commander of Advanced Operating Base (AOB)-North, stationed at Mazar-e Sharif International Airport in northern Afghanistan. Our company had just returned from an especially difficult deployment to the same area, less than nine months prior, and we were looking for better ways to enable the Afghan Special Operations. Although our AOB was focused on improving and measuring the capabilities of our Afghan partners, there were some leaders at the Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) headquarters that saw this as incongruent with the overarching political guidance “to pressure the Taliban to the negotiating table.” We decided that a data informed approach to tracking Afghan independent operations would be the best way to make our case to higher.
Data Framework
We knew it would be critical to understand the capabilities of our Afghan partners, so we developed a framework to carefully measure and record their ability to conduct collective tasks at the Kandak (battalion) level. Unlike US evaluations, which we conducted during training, these evaluations would take place during combat, with life-and-death consequences.
We based the metrics system for the evaluations around three different types of operations: advised, enabled, and independent.
Advised operations: Special Forces teams conducted combat operations alongside partners. Although the Afghans were technically in the lead, if a situation became unmanageable or risks to US forces were too high, US teams would take more control.
Enabled operations: Afghan forces conducted operations without US forces on the ground with them. These operations had significant US support, such as infiltration aircraft, ISR, MEDEVAC, and aerial fires.
Independent operations: Afghan forces planned and executed operations without US support. We closely monitored them, though, to allow for US support if needed.
We divided these metrics into the tangible and the intangible. Tangible metrics to evaluate Afghan partner capabilities included many of the typical counterterrorism measures: high-value individuals (HVIs) captured or killed, total enemy killed in action (EKIA), sensitive equipment recovered, friendly wounded or killed in action, structures and areas cleared, and local leader meetings or shuras conducted.
Additional tangible metrics assessed partner force management capability, such as force size, the ability to infiltrate/exfiltrate independently, the use of Afghan Tactical Air Controllers (ATAKs), support provided by Afghan artillery and mortars, and the use of Afghan ISR and electronic warfare.
Intangible metrics included command and control, integration with other Afghan forces, and logistical capabilities. Although I no longer have the specific data or framework we used, the below chart roughly captures the methodology we used to evaluate the combat capabilities of our Afghan Special Operations partners.
Planning
In early 2017, the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) created the 1st Special Operations Brigade (SOB), which was co-located with our AOB. Our mission was mentoring the SOB leadership, as it took command of the Special Operations Kandaks (SOK) in the northern provinces. This presented an opportunity to work collaboratively on data fusion and be more methodical in our efforts across northern Afghanistan.
When we arrived, the focus was distinctly on advised operations. This plan was in line with higher guidance and was seeing dividends. Even the increase in insider attacks was seen as an indication that the Taliban were less effective on the battlefield and were shifting to unconventional tactics. My goal was to understand which tactics were working during these advised operations and find ways to get the same results while focusing on Afghan independent operations.
We decided to conduct a mix of short-duration raids and major clearing operations to evaluate the leadership’s ability to command and control various sized operations. The chart below shows the increasing number of enabled and independent operations interspersed with the major clearing operations.
Testing the Hypothesis
While initially maintaining the tempo of advised operations, we began planning for the first major operation. It was to be a week-long clearance involving the 10th SOK and 215th Corp, and was tactically advised by two US Special Forces Detachments and an AOB advisory element. This was a highly successful operation, but relied heavily on support from US Special Forces teams at the tactical-level..
Subsequent major operations continued monthly, each growing the number of Afghan forces involved. By the final major operation in mid-2018, we’d grown to over 3,000 Afghans, and the leadership successfully integrated Afghan artillery, armor, ISR, and close air support.
Near the end of our deployment we analyzed the gathered data to compare the success of the enabled and independent operations. The data indicated that while we were now conducting almost exclusively enabled operations, we were still achieving 80% of the EKIA each month, but with no US forces on the ground for any of these missions. Other measures of success were almost unchanged: no drop in HVIs captured or killed and a slight increase in sensitive equipment removed. Notably we also had no US wounded or killed during any operation conducted in AOB-North. (Our company did suffer several casualties while supporting other AOB’s outside our Area of Responsibility).
Outbrief
Near the end of the deployment, we were told that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) would be coming to visit our base, and so we prepared to tell this data-driven story. Internal to the team, it was clear to us that the Afghan SOF were now fully capable to conduct operations. With limited support, our Afghan partners could accomplish comparable performance without any US partners on the ground. The critique I received from SOJTF-A was 180 degrees from what I expected.
After seeing the data, a senior officer at SOJTF-A replied with: "all I want is to see that line higher," referring to the EKIA line on the graph above. He continued with “the partners are not capable enough on their own,” and “your grandchildren will still be coming back to support them.” He fixed atthe political necessity to “force the Taliban to the negotiating table,” and was of the mind that only additional EKIA would force the issue.
Despite the clear rebuke of our efforts, I believed our data showed the Afghans were capable as long as we provided them the support they needed (ISR and fires). Because of my faith in our partners, and my faith in the data that proved their effectiveness, I decided that the data should speak for itself. A few weeks later I presented this same data to the Chairman, senior leaders from Washington, and the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) leadership. As I sat between the two 4-star Generals, I was praying for a better reaction. After finishing the report, the Chairman's smile and evident satisfaction with our direction validated our approach. This positive response not only affirmed our strategy but also highlighted the power of data-driven decision-making in shaping military operations and policy at the highest levels.
Conclusion
In hindsight, it is clear now that the ANA was not fully ready to own the security situation in all of Afghanistan. But I think the data we collected still clearly showed that even back in 2018 there were pockets of success within the ANA and ANASOC.
In 2019, I deployed again to Afghanistan as the operations officer for Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (SOTF-A). By then, we shifted completely away from enabled operations, and were back to conducting exclusively advised operations. This was primarily due to their effectiveness in achieving higher EKIA goals. I think if we could have continued to collect data on the effectiveness of enabled operations, we likely would have seen higher improvements in the capabilities of our partners.
About the Author:
Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Horrigan is currently retiring from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. His diverse background in engineering, special operations, and advanced technology uniquely positions him to understand the importance of data in military decision-making.
As a young Engineer Officer, he served in positions involving Geographic Information Systems and Geospatial Analysis. As a Special Forces Officer, he completed multiple combat deployments, providing him with firsthand experience in operational environments. He also completed the Service Chief Fellowship Program at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), further expanding his expertise in cutting-edge military technologies. He continues to assist DARPA and USSOCOM in transitioning key technologies, bridging the gap between research and practical military applications.
LTC Horrigan also served as an instructor in the US Army Special Forces Officer Qualification Course, where he was able to share his knowledge and experience with the next generation of Special Forces leaders.
His educational background, which includes a Bachelor's in Applied Mathematics, a Master's in Astronautics, and a Graduate Certificate in Space Systems further enhances his understanding of data-driven decision-making in military contexts. To continue to develop this expertise, he is currently pursuing a Master's in Computer Science and a Graduate Certificate in Data Science.
As LTC Horrigan begins his transition from military to civilian life, he will complete the DoD Skillbridge program with W8less, where he will oversee microPNT and autonomy solution development for military and civilian applications.